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vForeword
Modern military thinking is typically focused at the state level of analysis due to the in-
fluence of realism and other traditional international relation theories. Within these theories, 
nonstate threats are of little to no concern and the spread of economic liberalism across the 
globe, via globalized capitalism, is viewed as a positive outcome of the post-Cold War era. One 
could be led to believe that the early 21st century is indeed the time of the modern democratic 
state—a model derived from Western values including the equality of peoples and genders, 
mass political enfranchisement and laissez-faire economics. 
Recent events, however, suggest that setbacks are increasingly occurring to this enlight-
ened view of the world’s collective political future. Pushbacks by autocratic regimes are now 
taking place; power vacuums are developing in once autocratic states, resulting in attempts by 
organized crime and other violent nonstate actors to dominate the local landscape. Continued 
U.S. governmental budgetary dysfunction and the growing wealth disparities between the 
haves and haves-nots of the world—with increasing economic strains on our middle and lower 
classes—also are causes of concern. Last but not least of these setbacks is, of course, the severe 
downsizing of U.S. Army and sister military forces—the protective sword and shield of the 
world’s democracies—as a new age of austerity is being forced on our governmental institu-
tions and agencies. 
The author takes the contrarian view—in line with the elements of dark globalization he 
sees developing—regarding the nature of the emerging global security environment. Derived 
from city-level analysis—one in which both feral and criminal cities may come about—his ar-
gument centers around a world inhabited by numerous belligerent nonstate threats, a world that 
is increasingly becoming “toxic” to the values and institutions of the modern democratic state. 
Within such a worldview, he sees nation-building, as was attempted in Iraq and Afghanistan, as 
presently impossible. Further, even city-building may now be beyond our limited resources and 
capabilities. Rather, he suggests more limited policy objectives and operations be conducted in 
the use of our military forces and subsequent governmental interagency efforts. That is, they 
must presently focus on a “boots on the ground” approach only to “render safe” the targeted 
strategic and operational environment in which are our troops are deployed. The unique stra-
tegic perspective offered, U.S. military implications identified and conclusions reached in this 
paper most certainly warrant our further reflection and discussion.
     Gordon R. Sullivan
     General, U.S. Army Retired
     President, Association of the United States Army
14 April 2014
vi
An earlier version of this monograph was presented at the Global Cities and Global Slums 
panel at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention, San Francisco, 6 April 
2013. The author would like to thank Nils Gilman for his insightful comments related to that 
earlier version.
1The Emergence of Feral and Criminal Cities: 
U.S. Military Implications in a Time of Austerity
Introduction
Much has been written in recent years about the triumph of neoliberalism, the end of 
history, the win–win economics of globalism and other optimistic proclamations concerning 
the world’s collective political future. While the modern democratic state has prospered and 
replicated itself across much of the globe since 1900, it is increasingly feeling various forms 
of pressure on its social and political form of organization.1 With this in mind, due diligence 
dictates that we should balance such unbridled optimism about contemporary and emerging 
democratic states with some healthy pessimism. 
A recent example of such exuberance can be found in “Mexico Makes It,” an article that 
appeared in the March/April 2013 issue of Foreign Affairs:2 
[M]odern Mexico is a middle-class country. The World Bank estimates that some 95 
percent of Mexico’s population is in the middle or upper class. The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also puts most of Mexico’s popula-
tion on the upper rungs, estimating that 50 percent of Mexicans are middle class and 
another 35 percent are upper class. . . .3 
Today, Mexico has a vibrant and fiercely independent press, led by publications such 
as El Universal, Reforma and La Jornada. With the proliferation of social media and 
with information now publicly available through Mexico’s freedom of information 
law, passed in 2002, Mexican civil-society organizations and individual voters can 
criticize and shame corrupt bureaucrats and politicians.4
While the rise of Mexico with its globalized economy and democratic reforms is counter-
balanced with some mention of corruption and cartel violence plaguing that state, on the whole 
the essay reads more like a governmental press release. To add insult to injury concerning the 
glossing of Mexican cartel and gang violence and the loss of political control of regions (i.e., 
areas of impunity), the new Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) administration of President 
Enrique Peña Nieto has now instituted a blackout of press coverage on such negative forms of 
reporting.5 It was bad enough when the criminal insurgents in Mexico were terrifying the free 
press (including bloggers) in order to shut down their reportage of beheadings, dismemberments 
and other cartel atrocities. This new governmental censorship policy will serve only to further 
break the trust of the Mexican people, who were expecting so much more with democratization.
Half a world away and a decade earlier, President George W. Bush—in May 2003 
in a nationally televised speech from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham 
2Lincoln—proclaimed that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended.”6 This exultation also 
signified an overly optimistic political vision of the future. In hindsight, such operations against 
a third-tier conventionally armed state were the easy part of the conflict; what came next was 
an entirely different matter. Instead, we witnessed rampant terrorism and insurgency, constant 
suicide bombings, improvised explosive device (IED) ambushes and urban combat against 
foreign fighters so high on narcotics they forgot to drop after being mortally wounded.7 For our 
trouble, about $1.7 trillion of the current U.S. national debt of $16.7 trillion can be attributed 
to direct Iraqi war costs, with the eventual costs projected in the $4–6 trillion range after debt 
interest is factored into the equation.8 U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan, in turn, brought their own 
additional national expenditure burdens.
On the grand strategic level, the commonality between the situations in contemporary Mexico 
and Iraq is startling. We are also seeing the same process now taking place in Libya, Egypt 
and Syria. While Afghanistan does not fall within the same initial autocratic regime parameters, 
the back end of the conflict also follows a similar path.9 Essentially, what we are witnessing is 
the demise of autocratic regimes initiated via either external or internal political change. This 
change may be initially peaceful—as in a Mexico that is attempting to liberalize and democra-
tize; however, it is typically violent in nature and requires direct invasion, as in Iraq, and varying 
levels of rebellion and conflict, as seen in the Arab Spring countries of Libya, Egypt and Syria. 
Once the former autocratic regimes have been mortally weakened (if not fully excised) in 
these states, two basic futures for such states exist. The first is that of the promise of democratic 
process, universal suffrage, equality of the sexes, freedom of religion, a free and independent 
press and the many other benefits of 21st century Western civilization. This is the upside of the 
globalization of laissez-faire economics—the birth of new democratic and liberal states. The 
other future is that of the promise of varying degrees of neo-barbarism, privatized violence and 
atrocity, illicit economic activities and state partition by nonstate forces belonging to a bewil-
dering array of gangs, criminal organizations, terrorist and insurgent groups, private militias 
and other forms of violent nonstate actors (VNSAs).10 The breakup and political partition of 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was definitely a harbinger of things to come concerning the future 
trajectories upon which the peoples of former autocratic states would someday find themselves.
The U.S. Army has experienced the specter of dark globalization firsthand with its op-
erations of the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, first while rendering these states “safe for 
U.S. interests” and then trying to support the establishment of the institutions of democratic 
states as part of the nation-building process. Prior to those more recent campaigns, the stabi-
lization of states to mitigate the effects of human suffering generated by state failure, or even 
attempts to stave it off, have been undertaken. Typically, the context provided for such military 
operations—which can be defined by a multitude of terms such as operations-other-than-war, 
counterinsurgency, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and stability and support—is viewed 
at the level of the state. We consistently look at these issues from the levels of “state failure,” 
“nation-building” and “regime change.” 
Rather than from a statist perspective, we should consider that states are increasingly com-
prised of their major urban centers, as this is where the populace is migrating. Major cities, 
and in numerous instances the slums accompanying them, are where the political center of 
gravity is now shifting. This urbanization process is found in states with democratic and auto-
cratic systems alike. For instance, in 1950, a total of 86 cities each had a population over one 
million. This figure is expected to rise to well past 400 such cities by the mid-2000s, with one 
3target projection of 550 cities by 2015.11 These large cities and even larger megacities—some 
presently with urban footprints in the low twenty millions—not only represent concentrations 
of humanity but also concentrations of scientific, economic and political power.12 At the same 
time, however, they represent potential gravity wells of instability—predominantly in the 
Global South—with their billions of urban poor who represent the unwashed masses, destitute 
slum-dwelling sub-renters and squatters.13
Increasingly, where cities go, so do states; that is, if cities and their populations are vibrant 
and healthy, so will be the gestalt represented by the state.14 On the other hand, failed cities—
or, even worse, ones that have become criminalized—portend a very different state trajectory. 
States manifesting such cities, rather than simply falling into chaos, make for very different 
and unexpected nation- (and city-) building challenges. With this in mind, this monograph will 
provide an overview and analysis of contemporary feral and criminal research.15 It will then 
highlight the present plight of the United States, derived from the lack of political consensus 
and the new age of economic austerity that our nation is facing. These will mean that our ability 
to mitigate and respond to feral and criminal city emergence will be increasingly degraded. 
The U.S. military implications and a conclusion are then provided which suggest that how we 
use our national military force, especially “boots on the ground,” and what we can realistically 
achieve in our foreign campaigns needs to be both revaluated and scaled back. 
Feral and Criminal Cities Research
In 2003, Richard J. Norton published the essay “Feral Cities” in the Naval War College 
Review. This was updated in his 2010 work “Feral Cities: Problems Today, Battlefields 
Tomorrow?” in the inaugural issue of the Marine Corps University Journal.16 Baseline percep-
tions and definitions concerning feral cities from 2003 and 2010 are as follows:
The putative “feral city” is (or would be) a metropolis with a population of more than 
a million people in a state the government of which has lost the ability to maintain the 
rule of law within the city’s boundaries yet remains a functioning actor in the greater 
international system.17
A feral city is a metropolis in a nation-state where the government has lost the ability to 
maintain the rule of law within the city’s boundaries. These cities nevertheless remain 
connected to the greater international system through such avenues as trade and com-
munication. The most immediately recognizable example of such a city is present-day 
Mogadishu, Somalia.18
Derived from a diagnostic tool, cities are evaluated to determine their ferality level, span-
ning the green level with no danger of ferality taking place through the yellow level which is 
marginal in nature and then through the red level which signifies that a city is becoming feral. 
Cities themselves are viewed as a patchwork of these colors initially based on 12 measure-
ments, later increased to 15 (see table 1). At any given point in time, the mosaic of these colors 
results in a dominant color being assigned to a city. Category blurring and other methodological 
concerns were evident in the two Norton documents. Of note is the fact that the initial schema 
was moderated by political conservatism with the construct ending at the third (red) level of a 
city becoming feral but not actually being feral. A list of red level (becoming feral) cities was 
provided in Norton’s essays: Johannesburg (2003), Mogadishu (2003, 2010), Fallujah (2010), 
Gaza City (2010), Lagos (2010), New Orleans (2010), Nuevo Laredo (2010), Rio de Janerio 
(2010), Rosarito Beach (2010) and São Paulo (2010).19 
4Another writer on this topic is Matthew Frick, who wrote on the subject of “Feral Cities—
Pirate Havens” in a 2008 issue of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.21 While that essay broadened 
the construct to include coastal pirate cities, it did not fundamentally modify or enhance the 
initial theory. Feral city theorizing remained predominately within the U.S. sea services jour-
nals until 201122 with the publication of an essay by this author and John Sullivan expanding 
the ferality construct into the purple and black levels in the academic journal Small Wars & 
Insurgencies.23 These levels took the construct over the “political precipice” by actively stating 
that a fourth (purple) level—in which a city witnesses total institutional failure and becomes 
fully feral—and a fifth (black) level, in which a city reinstitutionalizes around criminal values, 
exist. While the original Norton construct initially viewed a city failing into ferality (chaos and 
institutional debonding) as the worst-case scenario, this new schema viewed the rise of the 
anticity—a city reconstituted around postmodern criminality—as a far greater security threat 
Table 1: No Danger, Marginal and Becoming Feral City Levels20
Green level 
(no danger)
Yellow level 
(marginal)
Red level 
(becoming feral)
Governance
Enacts effective legisla-
tion. Appropriately directs 
resources. Controls events 
in all portions of the city, 
day and night. Corruption 
detected and punished.
Exercises only patchwork 
or diurnal control. Highly 
corrupt.
At best, has only negotiated 
zones of control. At worst, 
does not exist.
Economy
Robust. Significant foreign 
investment. Provides goods 
and services. Provides a 
stable and adequate tax 
base.
Limited or no foreign 
investment. Subsidized or 
decaying industries. Grow-
ing deficits. Most foreign 
investment is quickly 
removable.
Local subsistence indus-
tries or industries based on 
illegal commerce. Some le-
gitimate business interests 
may be present, based on 
profit potential.
Services
Complete range of services, 
including educational and 
cultural, available to all city 
residents.
Can manage minimum level 
of public health, hospital 
access, potable water, trash 
disposal.
Intermittent to nonexistent 
power and water. Those 
who can afford to will 
privately contract or allow 
nongovernmental organiza-
tion to provide.
Security
Well-regulated, professional 
police forces. Response to 
wide spectrum of require-
ments.
Little regard for legality/
human rights. Police often 
matched/stymied by crimi-
nal “peers.”
Nonexistent. Security is 
attained through private 
means or paying protection.
Civil Society
Rich and robust. Construc-
tive relationships with 
government.
Relationships with govern-
ment are confrontational. 
Civil societal organizations 
fill governmental voids.
Civil society fractured along 
clan/ethnic/other lines. 
Local elites in control. 
Security-oriented civil 
society organizations may 
be criminal.
5to the Westphalian state.24 This new construct was further integrated into the evolutionary gang 
and cartel writings of Bunker and Sullivan. These writings, like those by other scholars focus-
ing on various forms of violent nonstate actors (VNSAs), are chronicling the contemporary 
shift from criminals to criminal–soldiers and from less sophisticated criminal–soldiers to more 
advanced and deadlier forms.25 
The purple and black levels are summarized in table 2. The purple (fully feral) level is 
viewed as an unstable Hobbesian condition which, if prolonged, will result first in the death of 
the constituent communities and eventually the city itself. An example of the early effects of 
this process is evident in cities such as Detroit and St. Louis where neighborhoods have either 
been abandoned and then bulldozed or used as firebreak corridors to protect the business and 
tourist districts, respectively.26 Presently Cape Town, the epitome of high rates of crime, in a 
country which has over 400,000 private security personnel—double that of police officers—is 
another city with increasing ferality within its environs.27 
The fifth or black level is that of the criminal city. While thought to be typically an ac-
cidental occurrence—via de facto politicalization of a cartel or other criminal entity to fill 
the vacuum of governance created due to compromised state institutions—premeditated forms 
derived from some of the more organized criminal insurgent groups represent another potenti-
ality. Examples of criminalized cities include Nuevo Laredo and Ciudad del Este. Such cities 
are no longer ours (i.e., belonging to sovereign states) but theirs (i.e., belonging to criminal 
organizations and networks), configured around the illicit economy for their revenue streams.28 
While these cities may also partake in licit and informal economic activities, essentially blur-
ring them with their illicit economic underpinnings, their new suzerains are hostile to the intent 
of neoliberal developmental and investment programs. While willing to accept Western gov-
ernmental and private aid monies, the rulers of criminal enclaves and cities will pocket those 
monies for the private enrichment of themselves, their families and clans and their retainers. 
This body of still relatively new feral and criminal city writings and supporting scholarship 
in other facets of dark globalization, including those focusing on the increasing size of the illicit 
economy and evolving forms of violent nonstate actors, portend numerous negative implica-
tions for the modern democratic state. These include, but are not limited to, strains being placed 
on the formal economy from which states draw their revenue lifelines, a crisis of ideology 
and religious belief with an accompanying rise in spiritual deviance (e.g., barbarism and even 
instances of human sacrifice)30 in areas where state militaries are deployed, and indigenous 
(urban) populations which have a stake in maintaining the status quo. As the latter typically 
benefits both licit and illicit local elites, these thus block any attempts at the implementation of 
Western development models. 
The Present Plight of the United States
Given the United States’ unique position as the undisputed leader of the free world fol-
lowing our victories in World War II and the Cold War, one would expect that its government 
would be in an envious economic position and functioning smoothly. This would provide us 
with a strong foundation from which to militarily and economically respond to the requirements 
needed to contend with threats emanating from feral and criminal cities—and possibly even turn 
around some of these cities themselves by means of aid and economic development programs. 
This, however, is far from the case. While we presently enjoy overwhelming conventional 
and power-projection capability and predominance, and have even begun to emerge from re-
cession, the apex of our military power has now passed. With upward momentum halted, we 
6have stalled and will soon begin to feel the effects of military decline. No relief to our present 
plight can be expected unless we can overcome a number of impediments to our system of 
governance:
• Lack of consensus in Congress: For decades now, the polarization between the political 
right and the political left in this nation has become increasingly exacerbated. Part of this 
problem may stem from the fact that the families of the representatives from the oppos-
ing parties now infrequently live in the Washington, DC area and no longer bond with 
one another as in years past; this had helped to bring some civility to the political process. 
Regardless of cause, this philosophical schism on how “governmental monies should be 
allocated for societal goods” has resulted in political gridlock and an inability for budget-
ary compromise. The 1 March 2013 sequestration order with its $85 billion cuts package, 
while in many ways a new low point in this process, is part of the ongoing dysfunction of 
U.S. governance.31 
Table 2: Fully Feral and Criminal City Levels29
Purple level 
(fully feral)
Black level 
(beyond feral; criminal city)
Governance
Does not exist. Extortion of monies, goods 
and services replaces taxation. Localized 
control by street gangs, cartels, private 
armies and warlords.
Legislation and policy based on strongman 
rule and personal whims. Taxation replacing 
extortion. Resources directed without the 
consent of the governed. Controls events in 
all portions of the city, day and night. Corrup-
tion is the system.
Economy
Illegal commerce and industries dominate. 
Barter system in effect. Legitimate business 
interests, if present, based on high profit po-
tential and heavily armed/have made alliance 
with criminal groups.
Active. Some foreign investment. Goods and 
services, both legitimate and illicit, openly 
provided. Illicit revenues from criminal activi-
ties supplemented by tax base (developing).
Services
Highly erratic to nonexistent services. Those 
who can afford to will privately contract or 
establish own services (e.g., generators/
wells). Most nongovernmental organization 
providers have left.
Services, including educational and cultural, 
available to city residents who are loyal/ 
contracted to the criminal government.
Security
Nonexistent. Total collapse of police forces 
and judiciary. Security is attained through 
private means, paying protection and rise of 
militias/fortified enclaves. Widespread use of 
mercenaries.
Reasonable levels of security provided 
in public spaces. Police forces (mafia in 
uniform) provide internal security for ruling 
autocrats.
Civil Society
Civil society in ongoing conflict between 
clans/ethnic/other lines. Most local elites 
have fled. Written press no longer exists. 
Security-oriented civil society organizations 
are criminal.
Total shift in value systems to criminal 
(narco). Spirituality is death/greed-based. 
The strong prey upon the weak; women are 
disenfranchised.
7• Increasing public (and family) debt: Stemming from the simple inability of the U.S. 
government to bring in more than it spends, public debt has been mounting and, as before 
mentioned, now stands at $16.7 trillion. This represents about 106 percent of the present 
U.S. Gross Domestic Product of $15.66 trillion (2012 estimate).32 While fingers are 
readily pointed at the reasons for these high debt levels—too much money going to en-
titlements, guns (defense), butter (social welfare) or even to waste and fraud—the result 
is the same. Further, public debt servicing presently accounts for $359.8 billion or 14.5 
percent of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 federal budget outlays of $2.469 trillion. The sever-
ity of this situation is better understood when public debt servicing is combined with the 
FY 2013 budget deficit of $1.327 trillion; the aggregate amount of $1.69 trillion means 
that 68 percent of the present budget is negatively influenced by debt servicing and new 
public debt.33 Individual family debt and lack of savings issues are of additional concern 
with about 46.7 percent of U.S households holding an average credit card balance of 
about $15,257. Further, the bottom 50 percent of U.S. households presently hold only 
about 1.1 percent of the nation’s wealth if limited household equity, furnishings and other 
factors such as vehicles are taken into consideration.34
• Dwindling economic resources: The strain of the ongoing public debt load in tandem 
with a combination of governmental overcommitment to various domestic and foreign 
obligations and an inability to bring in more revenues is beginning to take its toll. The 
fiscal tricks of currency manipulation, the selling of public debt and creative accounting 
can serve only to stave off the day of economic reckoning. Of note is that while public 
and private (middle and lower income family) resources are constrained, U.S. corpora-
tions held a record level of cash on hand—$1.45 trillion—as of 31 December 2012, 
with the bulk of it held in overseas accounts which the U.S. government is unable to 
tax as profits.35 This further illustrates the fact that a sovereign free (off the U.S. books) 
economy is developing which highlights our inability to extract economic resources from 
it. When coupled with the growing illicit economy which we are expending revenues to 
combat, such as in the case of drug trafficking, we are not only passively losing revenue 
but also sustaining high levels of cash “burn rates” to mitigate some of the darker effects 
of globalization.
• Process over performance: When bureaucracies run efficiently, they provide an indus-
trial-type process with ongoing and measured governmental outputs much like those of 
a factory production line. The outputs themselves can be measured for their tangible and 
real-world value and impact. The condition we now have in the United States is very dif-
ferent. We are seeing the multiplication of risk-adverse bureaucracies with zero tolerance 
for failure. Such agencies and institutions fear any form of allegation of scandal or impro-
priety being leveled against them and, as a result, grind to a halt in their activities. Such 
bureaucracies measure success by engaging in the process of appearing busy, focusing on 
the process rather than actual performance outputs. Success quickly becomes defined by 
engagement in endless meetings with no decision or resolution of an issue taking place. 
Ultimately, dogma and ritual replace any form of operational relevance in the day-to-day 
activities of such organizations. 
If the above impediments were not so serious, the situation in which the United States now 
finds itself could be likened to a group of lemmings going over a cliff. Death is by myopia 
and incrementalism—U.S. elected officials walking in lock step to their (and our) demise. 
This, sadly, is the nature of contemporary American politics, with short-term benefits taking 
8precedence over the long-term good of the nation. We presently appear to have an excess of 
politicians and a dearth of statesmen. While the democratic process is meant to be inefficient 
in order to preserve civil liberties and provide for a system of checks and balances, all citizens 
agree that something is very much wrong with the current political process in Washington and 
that this affliction has existed for some time now.
U.S. Military Implications 
Derived from the preceding analysis, the constitution of the modern democratic state—its 
physical strength, its health—should at least be questioned if not openly accepted as some-
what clouded. Additionally, the global environment in which the modern democratic state 
resides appears to be becoming increasingly “toxic” to its values, institutions and economic 
and military foundations. To further complicate matters, the United States is now entering the 
downslope of its power curve, with no fix or reform in sight for the foreseeable future. If these 
developments are indeed the case, then a contrarian view of what is achievable and what is 
prudent in the conduct of certain forms of U.S. foreign military operations is warranted. With 
this consideration in mind, four military implications will be highlighted and discussed. Of 
benefit to the reader is the fact that these military implications can be placed in recent context—
as an outcome of the many lessons learned for more than a decade now stemming from U.S. 
deployments into Iraq and Afghanistan and subsequent drawdowns:
• Nation-building (and possibly even city-building) is presently impossible. In line with 
recent experiences in Iraq and especially in Afghanistan, the proposition of bringing dem-
ocratic governance to formerly autocratic and criminalized states that have been invaded 
and occupied by the United States is now simply untenable. While the post-World War 
II occupations of Western Germany and Japan provide the archetypical examples of 
success in this regard, they must now be considered historical anachronisms. Even the 
more recent successful integration of some of the former Soviet bloc states into the 
European Union can no longer be considered the present norm. Additionally, such opera-
tions greatly deplete our national treasure—the direct U.S. cost during the nation-building 
phase of post-May 2003 Iraq for military operations alone exceeded $650 billion.36 If that 
were not enough, the ill-fated U.S. attempts at nation-building in Afghanistan represent 
nothing more than one of history’s greatest multibillion-dollar mega-lottery wins for the 
Hamid Karzai family and extended clan. 
• Crime and war, licit and illicit are all the same. As states fragment and their sovereign 
prerogatives diminish, the institutional and bureaucratic distinctions between crime and 
war, public and private and licit and illicit activities and domains erode and break down. 
Not only do these gray-area or crime-war operational environments confound U.S. mili-
tary responses but, possibly even more important, they provide a strong inhibitor to U.S. 
attempts at nation- (and city-) building derived from foreign and private aid programs. 
This is no clearer than in regions where narcotics and other illicit economy activities dom-
inate. Attempting to substitute low-profit licit industries and enterprises as a component 
of the nation-building process is presently futile—high-profit narcotics trafficking and the 
ensuing governmental corruption that goes with it are almost impossible to mitigate.37
• Boots on the ground are deployed only to render safe. With any form of nation- or 
city-building out of the question and the operational environment into which our Soldiers 
deployed chaotic in nature and devoid of clear distinctions between soldiers and criminals 
9or legitimate and illicit economies, the mission that we give our forces is required to be 
both limited and selective in its objectives. When our Soldiers’ boots are on the ground, 
they should be part of an offensive operation and should remain in country only to render 
the situation safe for well-defined U.S. national interests—first and foremost, to ensure 
that the homeland is no longer threatened. Our troops should be committed only as part of 
a proportional escalation regime; mission creep, or what we can term “unwarranted 21st 
century foreign entanglement,” needs to be avoided at all costs.
• We need to make better use of proxies and armed “toasters.”38 Our Soldiers (and 
Marines) are some of the best trained and equipped troops in the world today. They are 
also very expensive to put into the field and sustain once committed to an operation. 
Given the built-in austerity in our future military budgets, we will be required to do more 
with less. Following a “hamburger helper” logic, we can extend the capability of our 
national forces by drawing upon select auxiliaries from allied foreign nations (with a 
lower per-soldier cost basis) and increasingly using robots, not only as armed drones but 
as defensive gun turrets and mobile fighting platforms (both of which can be manned by 
tele-operators who are offshore or back in the United States).39
Conclusions
This monograph has shown that the literature focusing on the emergence of feral and crimi-
nal cities has real-world military implications. Further, when coupled with the present plight 
of the United States as defined by the current impediments to our system of governance, a 
“double whammy” situation is now taking place. The implications are that, when engaging 
in U.S. foreign military operations, nation-building (and potentially even city-building) is not 
presently tenable. Rather than attempting to engage in such an endeavor (and the concurrent 
counterinsurgency strategy integrated to support it), the desired end state of simply rendering a 
vanquished state or city safe may now be “good enough” for U.S. basic national security policy 
requirements.
Further, since the distinctions between crime and war, public and private and licit and illicit 
activities and domains are blurring, we should deploy troops on the ground in “render safe” 
operations only. When our troops are deployed, allied auxiliaries and armed robots should be 
fielded in support of them. In a time of increasing U.S. budgetary austerity and the growing 
criminalization of various regions of the globe, especially in the Western Hemisphere, a shep-
herding of U.S. national treasure is not only practical but strategically prudent.
While the above observations and their implications provide sound guidance for foreign 
(away from the continental United States) military operations, the threat of feral and crimi-
nal cities and enclaves emerging near our borders, and potentially within them, is an entirely 
different matter.40 In various cities in Mexico that border the United States, such as Tijuana 
and Ciudad Juarez, it is imperative that federal (sovereign) political authority be maintained. 
The same goes for regions of the northern Mexican countryside that contain numerous small 
towns and villages. In both these complex urban and more rural environments, federal Mexican 
operations have taken place and are presently taking place.41 Further, concern exists domesti-
cally within the United States that in certain areas community failure may lead to city ferality, 
if not criminal takeover, of some urban enclaves. While such concerns may presently sound 
far-fetched, Chicago is undergoing a shooting gang war on the streets over drug distribution 
(tied into the Mexican cartels) and in American society we are increasingly witnessing the 
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polarization of wealth between the wealthy haves and the have-nots, with a diminishing white-
collar and professional class caught in the middle.42
As a result, the rise of feral and criminal cities and enclaves near and within the United States 
should be afforded a priority response. While the mandate to directly mitigate and respond to 
such scenarios is outside of the U.S. Army (and Marines and Special Forces) purview, these 
armed services and commands should at the very least be cognizant of such threats and, if 
required, how they can provide training and other forms of support, as U.S. Army North is 
presently doing with the Mexican government.43 
Getting back to warfighting and combat issues, ultimately, we do not want to eventually 
find ourselves in Ralph Peters’ prophetic situation where indeed we must deploy “our soldiers 
into their cities,” but this is increasingly a potential reality in many regions of the globe.44 If 
some of these expeditions and operations must be launched, we must now recognize the fact 
that we may be unable presently to take these cities and make them ours, any more than we 
could enter Afghanistan or Iraq and bring the “light of Western civilization” to these far-off 
nations with their own tribal customs, religions and other culture-specific institutions and pat-
terns of human existence.45 At best, we should contain and neutralize—render safe—as cheaply 
as possible from a national military power perspective the nonstate threats that arise.46
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